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FOREWORD
Although China is not an Arctic state, Chinese officials are taking great pains to demonstrate its intrinsic
interests in the Arctic region. As China’s global role
has grown, it is not surprising that Chinese leaders
should seek to take advantage of economic opportunities afforded by the melting Arctic ice, and they are
preparing to confront the environmental consequences of Arctic climate change. At this stage, the Chinese
leadership has yet to issue an Arctic strategy, although
Chinese experts continue to debate their country’s interests and goals in the Arctic. U.S.-China relations in
the Arctic have thus far been cooperative, but China’s
growing economic and political ties with Arctic states
bear scrutiny, especially in the context of heightened
tensions between Russia, China’s strategic partner,
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Dr. Wishnick, an expert on China and Russia, who
has previously contributed monographs to the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) on U.S. policy and regional
security in Eurasia (Russia, China, and the United States
in Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Competition
and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis,
2009; Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed, 2004; Growing
U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia, 2002), examines
China’s diplomacy toward the Arctic states and the
prospects for cooperation or conflict between China
and the United States in the Arctic. Indeed, China
finds itself at a relative disadvantage in the Arctic and
consequently has opted for multilateral approaches
that make use of its observer status in the region’s lone
governance institution, the Arctic Council, a sharp
contrast from the country’s typical preference for
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bilateral diplomatic mechanisms that take advantage
of its superior economic leverage.
In this Letort Paper, Dr. Wishnick highlights that
China is playing a long game in the Arctic and is deftly building partnerships with a wide range of partners
in the region to make sure that China will have a voice
on Arctic affairs in the future. She argues that conflict
has not characterized the Arctic region thus far and
that China’s growing interest in the region is unlikely
to change that. Nonetheless, she highlights that China’s actions in the Arctic have a great impact on U.S.
global priorities, including: freedom of navigation; the
economic and political stability of Europe; and strategic concerns in other areas, such as the role of Russia
in Europe and of China in the South China Sea.
Although cooperation has largely characterized
the interaction among Arctic states in the post-Cold
War period, she further points out the danger that the
conflict over European security issues between Russia
and NATO will spill over into the Arctic. Russia has
the longest coastline in the Arctic Circle and needs to
invest in infrastructure to develop it. Dr. Wishnick argues that discussion of an “icebreaker gap” is not very
helpful—it would make no sense for the United States
to compete with Russia, which has an extensive Arctic
coastline, in the deployment of icebreakers, nor do we
have the resources or rationale to do so. This Letort
Paper concludes with a discussion of the mismatch
between available security governance mechanisms in
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the Arctic and current threats, and makes suggestions
for new approaches to address current Arctic security
issues.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
		
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of China’s growing involvement in the Arctic
for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic
strategy, including its political and military components, is discussed. Next, China’s interests and goals in
the Arctic are addressed. A third section examines the
Arctic in China’s relations with Canada, Russia, and
the Nordic states. This Letort Paper then evaluates the
consequences of China’s expanding Arctic presence
for U.S. security interests and concludes with policy
recommendations.
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CHINA’S INTERESTS AND GOALS
IN THE ARCTIC:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
As China becomes a global power, it is not surprising that it is turning its attention to the Arctic, one
of the last great frontiers, to take advantage of new
economic opportunities and join in global efforts to
understand the implications of climate change in the
region. Indeed, Chinese experts take great pains to
demonstrate their country’s longstanding interest in
the Arctic, dating to 1925 when China signed the Svalbard Treaty, which establishes Norwegian sovereignty
over Svalbard (islands formerly called Spitzbergen) as
a well as a regime to demilitarize, protect and provide
access to the area’s resources. In 2004, China acquired
its first foothold in the Arctic when it opened its first
Arctic research facility, the Yellow River Station, on
Svalbard. To Arctic states, however, China is a powerful outsider and China’s growing involvement in the
region has attracted some of the greatest scrutiny of all
the non-Arctic states seeking to play a role there.
The Chinese government has yet to release its
Arctic strategy, though some recent official statements have outlined Chinese positions on a number
of economic, political, and environmental issues. Chinese analysts have been debating what China’s role
in the Arctic should be and how best to categorize
China’s position so as to enable it to take advantage
of opportunities and participate in Arctic affairs.
However, some provocative statements by prominent
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Chinese officials that identify China as a “near-Arctic state” and refer to the resources in the region as
the “common heritage of mankind” have dominated
the international media discussion of China and the
Arctic.
At the same time that China has been elaborating
its position on the Arctic, developing its capacity to
participate in Arctic economic and scientific affairs,
and activating its Arctic diplomacy, the United States
has been refining its own Arctic strategy largely in
response to threats and opportunities opened up by
changes in the Arctic environment. Although the
United States and China have largely had cooperative
relations in the Arctic, China’s emergence as an Arctic
player takes place at a time of rising tension between
China and the United States over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, China’s emergence as a
global naval power, and a deepening Sino-Russian
partnership, involving some cooperative projects in
the Arctic. Moreover, the worsening international climate in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine and rising
tensions between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) threaten to remilitarize the
Arctic, which, since the end of the Cold War, regional
stakeholders have sought to develop into a zone of
peaceful cooperation.
This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of China’s growing involvement in the Arctic
for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic
strategy is discussed, including its political and military components. Next, China’s interests and goals in
the Arctic are addressed. A third section examines the
Arctic in China’s relations with Canada, Russia, and
the Nordic states. This Letort Paper then evaluates the
consequences of China’s expanding Arctic presence
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for U.S. security interests and concludes with policy
recommendations.
BACKGROUND
According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
the Arctic—areas north of the Arctic Circle (lat. 66.56°
N) amounting to 6 percent of the world’s landmass,
including parts of Alaska—holds the world’s largest remaining supplies of unexplored oil and gas,
mostly offshore. Potentially there could be as much
as 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of liquid natural gas
(LNG).1 This identifies, according to the USGS mean
estimate, that 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered
oil, 30 percent of undiscovered gas, and 20 percent of
the world’s LNG can be found in the Arctic.2 Arctic
areas also contain vast quantities of minerals, including gold, platinum, lead, iron, zinc, uranium, and rare
earths.
Because the Arctic ice has been melting at a faster
pace in recent years, these resources may be recoverable, once states acquire the necessary infrastructure
and technological capacities to explore in these areas. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2012 saw the lowest extent of Arctic ice coverage recorded, 49% below the 1979-2000 average for
that month.3 See Figure 1 for a comparison of the sea
ice extent during the typical minimum-level month of
1979 versus 2014, and Figure 2 for a depiction of the
2012 low ice compared to the median line.
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Figure 1. Dwindling Arctic Sea Ice.4

Figure 2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Special Sensor Microwave Imager/
Sounder (SSMIS) View of the 2012 Record Low
Arctic Ice.5
4

The National Snow and Ice Data Center reports
that the ice extent for November 2016 was the lowest on record, based on satellite observations (see
Figure 3).6

Figure 3. The National Snow and Ice Data Center
Sees a Record Low Ice Cover For 2016.7
Less Arctic ice in the summer months means more
opportunities for shipping and tourism. Arctic cruises
are now an option and the Crystal Line, an American
luxury cruise outfit, made its first 32-day cruise along
the Northwest Passage in August-September 2016,
with 1,070 passengers and 655 crew aboard. Although
the cabin price per person ranged from $22,000 to
$46,000 per person, the cruise reportedly sold out
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within a week.8 This cruise involved 3 years of planning for the company, as well as the coordinated cooperation of U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard authorities to address potential maritime safety issues in the
still uncertain environment of the Northwest Passage,
which, though more navigable in summer months
than a decade ago, still lacks sufficient infrastructure
for widespread commercial use.
According to the U.S. Coast Guard, the expansion
of commercial activity will pose substantial logistical
challenges in case of a shipping accident or oil spill.
Barrow, Alaska, the only major U.S. city in the Arctic Circle, has only limited air and sea access. Dutch
Harbor, the only deepwater port the United States
has, is in the Aleutian Islands, more than 1,200 miles
away from Barrow. There are limited airports, roads,
and communications infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic.
At present, the United States has only two functioning icebreakers: the recently overhauled Polar Star, a
heavy icebreaker; and the Healy, a medium icebreaker,
which is mainly used to support scientific research.9

Table 1. Selected World-Wide Icebreaker
Capability, Data from May 21, 2015.10
6

Shipping companies also see opportunity in the reduced summer ice cover to lower their shipping times
by using the two trans-Arctic shipping routes: the
Northwest Passage in North America, and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in Europe. In the short term, the
unpredictability of Arctic ice floes makes these routes
impractical for container shipping, because they require an exact timeframe, but are better suited to bulk
shipping. A third route, the transpolar route, is not
yet navigable. Destinational shipping, in support of
resource extraction in the Arctic, will also increase as
economic activity increases in the region. Nonetheless,
despite the current changeable conditions, shipping
through the Bering Straits has doubled since 2007 and
there are now approximately 400 transit shipments
annually.11 However, shipping along the full length
of the Northwest Passage remains modest, approximately 75 vessels from 2011-2015 traveled this route,
compared to over 200 for the NSR during the same
period (see Figure 4).12 The NSR reduces travel time
from Asia to Europe, versus the Suez Canal route, by
about 10 days; and the Northwest Passage is 4 days
shorter than the Panama Canal route.
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Figure 4. U.S. Navy Estimates of the Likelihood of
Open Water Navigation in the Arctic.13
According to the U.S. Navy, the NSR will see the
greatest expansion of shipping in the near term and
mid term. By 2020, the Navy predicts that the Transpolar Route will be navigable for short periods; and
by 2030, there will be significant opportunities for
shipping along all three routes (see Figure 5).14
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Figure 5. U.S. Navy Estimates of the Navigability
of the Polar Routes.15
Nonetheless, Arctic areas are highly vulnerable to
the effects of climate change, and changes to date (receding ice, rising seawater, warming water temperatures, and the impacting effect on animals and fish)
have already altered the hunting practices of indigenous communities and forced some to relocate. Moreover, the effects of climate change in the Arctic region
itself, by releasing methane from melting permafrost,
may compound the impact of climate changes in areas
south of the Arctic.16 The unusual melting in Northwest Greenland in 2015 led to a phenomenon known
as Arctic amplification, according to which the disproportionate impact of climate change on the Arctic led
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to additional ice melting, which left more open water
that in turn absorbed additional heat from the sun,
which led to even greater warming.17 These trends
heighten the importance of scientific research on processes of climate change in the Arctic for regional and
non-Arctic states alike.
Arctic governance first evolved as a result of environmental concerns and geopolitical changes in
the late 1980s. At the time, the Arctic was the only
land border between NATO countries and the Soviet
Union, while U.S. and Soviet submarines engaged in
tense cat and mouse games under the region’s frozen
waters. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident and the
Soviet Union’s dumping of radioactive waste in the
Kola Peninsula and White Sea heightened concern
in Europe about transboundary pollution. Finland,
which borders on the Kola peninsula, responded by
engaging its Arctic neighbors in a diplomatic effort
to cooperate in environmental protection, an effort
which culminated in a 1991 meeting where the eight
Arctic states signed a Declaration on the Protection
of the Arctic Environment and agreed to the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy. The international
climate was propitious for such an initiative, as thenSoviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had called for the
Arctic to become a “zone of peace” in a 1987 speech
in Murmansk, located in the Russian Arctic. Former
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney responded
to Gorbachev’s appeal 2 years later with a proposal for
the Arctic Council that came into being in 1996 with
Canada as its first chairman.18
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U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE ARCTIC
In 1971, the National Security Decision Memorandum 144 first defined three broad U.S. goals in the
Arctic: 1) minimizing environmental damage; 2) enhancing international cooperation; and, 3) protecting
the security of the region, including freedom of navigation and airspace.19 The Reagan administration’s
1983 National Security Decision Directive added scientific research as a fourth goal of U.S. Arctic policy;20
and the 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act established a commission to develop U.S. Arctic research.
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/National Security Council
(NSC)-26 issued in 1994, and the Bush administration’s final presidential directive of January 9, 2009,
the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)66, further elaborated the goals of the U.S. Arctic policy. According to the 2009 document, U.S. Arctic policy
aimed to:
1. Meet national security and homeland security
needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its
biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and
economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the
eight Arctic nations . . . ;
5. Involve indigenous communities in decisions that
affect them; and,
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research.21

According to NSPD-66, U.S. national security and
homeland security interests in the Arctic include:
• Maintaining missile defense and early warning
systems;
11

• Deploying sea and air systems for strategic
sealift ( i.e. transport of military personnel and
equipment);
• Pursuing strategic deterrence;
• Asserting a stronger maritime presence and enhancing maritime security operations;
• Ensuring freedom of navigation (especially
transit passage) and overflight; and,
• Preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating
criminal or hostile acts.22
To carry out U.S. national security and homeland
security interests, NSPD-66 asks U.S. agencies to:
1. Develop greater capabilities and capacity . . . to
protect [U.S. Arctic borders and interests];
2. Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness . . . to
protect [trade, infrastructure, and resources];
3. Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft [in the Arctic];
4. Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of . . . United States
interests; and,
5. Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes.23

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, the first
issued after former President Barack Obama took
office, depicted the United States as:
an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our
national security needs, protect the environment,
responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and
strengthen international cooperation on a wide range
of issues.24
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In April 2011, one of the first steps the Obama administration took regarding Arctic security was to consolidate the military command over U.S. Arctic territories
(including Alaska) and waters under the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Previously, NORTHCOM had shared this responsibility with the European Command and the Pacific Command (PACOM).25
In May 2013, the Obama administration’s Arctic
policy expanded on the Bush administration’s Arctic
directive in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.26
The 2013 national strategy reflects changes in the Arctic environment that led to growing interest in trade
and resource development in the region by Arctic and
non-Arctic states. The document includes discussion
of the role of the Arctic in ensuring U.S. energy security, the role of the Arctic Council and International
Maritime Organization (the United Nations [UN]
agency focusing on maritime safety and security) in
Arctic governance, and the need to discuss Arctic issues with all interested parties, including non-Arctic
states and nonstate actors.
The U.S. Coast Guard, the maritime arm of the Department of Homeland Security, also outlined its vision for the Arctic region in May 2013, which highlights
the importance of modernizing governance, broadening partnerships, and improving domain awareness.27
The latter involves enhancing communication and information sharing, improving information gathering
and intelligence, and achieving an effective maritime
presence in the Arctic region.28
After the Obama administration unveiled its Arctic
strategy, the U.S. military followed suit. In November
2013, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) outlined
its strategy for the Arctic as “a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded,
the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work
13

cooperatively to address challenges.”29 This would entail ensuring environmental and human security, supporting safety, promoting defense cooperation, and
preparing to respond to challenges and contingencies,
preferably in conjunction with allies and partners in
the region. The strategy notes the considerable uncertainties involved in ensuring the security and stability
of the Arctic as well as the potential for miscommunication and inflammatory rhetoric to exacerbate tensions over sovereignty and other interstate issues.
In January 2014, the Obama administration outlined the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. In the security area, the plan
largely took a long-term approach, advocating a range
of studies on projected maritime activity in the region,
assessing telecommunications infrastructure, evaluating the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to
enhance maritime domain awareness, sustaining capabilities to operate in Arctic waters, and encouraging
the use of renewable energy. The only concrete plans
involved completing ongoing aviation infrastructure
improvements and continuing maritime exercises in
the region.30 After Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski
criticized the implementation plan for lacking a “real
path to action,” Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)
as the Special Representative for the Arctic in July of
2014.31
In February 2014, the U.S. Navy issued a report
outlining its objectives in the Arctic to 2030. These
include:
•
•

Ensure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide
homeland defense;
Providing ready naval forces to respond to crisis and
contingencies;
14

•
•

Preserve freedom of the seas; and,
Promote partnerships within the United States Government and with international allies and partners
[emphasis in original].32

The Navy’s key missions, such as maritime security,
protection of sea lanes, and access to maritime resources, power projection, and search and rescue, will
also be important in defining its role in the Arctic in
coming decades.33
The United States began its second 2-year term as
Chairman of the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental organization of Arctic states, on April 24, 2015.34
As Chairman, the U.S. focuses on three priorities:
“Improving Economic & Living Conditions for Arctic
Communities; Arctic Ocean Safety, Security & Stewardship; [and] Addressing the Impacts of Climate
Change.”35 The Arctic Council was established in 1996
and its permanent membership includes eight Arctic
states—Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and
the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
Russia, and the United States—and six permanent
participants, which are groups representing Arctic indigenous peoples.36
The priorities of the United States as Chairman of
the Arctic Council reflect the organization’s emphasis
on environmental, scientific, and economic cooperation. This organization has never sought to play a role
in security governance, and stakeholders tend to view
security concerns as intrusions in its governance. In
fact, the Ottawa Declaration—the founding document
for the forum—specifically states, “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military
security.”37 As a consequence, the Arctic Council’s
agreements on maritime security, such as the 2009

15

Agreement on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue in the Arctic, and the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Preparedness and Response
in the Arctic, focus on coordination among the Coast
Guards of Arctic states rather than the involvement of
their militaries.38 Nonetheless, the United States mentions Arctic Ocean security in its priorities for its current period of chairmanship, which reflects its greater
emphasis on security than many other Arctic states.
According to Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Commandant
of the Danish Royal Defence Academy, the U.S. priority on freedom of navigation in Arctic waters puts
Washington at odds with Canada and Russia, because
both assert that what the U.S. considers international
straits are their internal waters.39 Since the United
States has yet to ratify the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), the U.S. government is unable
to assert any territorial claims of its own in the Arctic,
though the United States follows UNCLOS as customary law.
With the United States assuming a higher profile
role on Arctic Affairs, observers inside and outside
government have criticized the Obama administration
about its priorities for the region and the resources
committed to implement them. Heather Conley, an
Arctic expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argued in 2014 that the administration lacked a long-term vision for the Arctic and the
budgetary allocation to develop needed infrastructure
in the region.40 Senators Murkowski (R-Alaska) and
Angus King (I-Maine) created the Senate Arctic Caucus in March 2015 to develop legislation for improved
Arctic infrastructure and to better focus attention on
regional concerns.41 The conference report on the fiscal year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act
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also requires the Secretary of Defense to update the
U.S. Arctic strategy (last issued in 2013) within 1 year
of the legislation’s passage,42 i.e. by November 25,
2016; however, by January 1, 2017, a new strategy had
yet to be released to the public.
The Obama administration had sought to refocus
efforts on the region. In January 2015, the Obama administration issued an Executive Order for Enhancing
Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic, which
created an Arctic Executive Steering Committee for
the U.S. government, housed in the White House Office. Headed by Mark Brzezinski, a former U.S. Ambassador to Sweden and NSC Director for Russia and
Eurasia, the new committee was designed to better
coordinate Arctic efforts throughout the government,
improve engagement with Alaskan and Arctic native
communities, as well as support the U.S. role as Chairman of the Arctic Council in 2015-17.43
Former President Obama expressed a particular
interest in Arctic issues and visited Alaska in early
September 2015—including a stop in Kotzebue, the
first presidential visit to a U.S. city in the Arctic Circle—to call attention to the effects of climate change
on the state.44 The former President addressed a State
Department conference on Global Leadership in the
Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement, and
Resilience (called the GLACIER conference), and the
White House dedicated a webpage to the presidential visit, which includes a series of podcasts detailing Obama’s personal reflections on the threat climate
change poses to Alaska.45
The visit was notable for several reasons. During
his visit to Alaska, Obama announced the administration’s commitment to acquiring a new heavy
icebreaker and building additional icebreaker capac-
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ity. The Coast Guard estimates that three heavy icebreakers and three medium icebreakers would be
needed to meet its mission demands in polar regions.46
The President explained that the U.S. icebreaker fleet
has declined since the end of World War II, when we
had seven, to three today under U.S. Coast Guard
command (with only two fully operational, and only
one of those a heavy icebreaker). The President noted
that Russia, by comparison, has more than forty icebreakers with at least another eleven planned.47
In March 2016, the White House Arctic Executive
Steering Committee issued a progress report on the
implementation of the 2013 Arctic strategy as well as a
5-year implementation plan. Following the 2013 Arctic strategy, the 2016 progress report emphasizes the
priority of advancing U.S. security interests. This goal
is to be implemented by improving domain awareness
(through various mapping efforts in the Arctic), upgrading infrastructure in anticipation of greater access
to the Arctic, highlighting freedom of the seas, and enhancing energy security in a sustainable and safe way.
Although expanding the U.S. icebreaker capability is a
primary concern, the lack of an Arctic deepwater port
is another consideration, and the Army Corps of Engineers was investigating the merits of such a facility for
Nome, Alaska. A 2011 Naval War College simulation
of an Arctic Operation concluded:
the U.S. Navy does not have the means to support sustained operations in the Arctic. This was due primarily to the lack of appropriate ship types to operate in
or near Arctic ice, the lack of support facilities in the
Arctic, and the lack of sufficient or capable logistics
connectors to account for the long logistics distances
and lack of facilities.48
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With the decline in world oil prices, however, Shell
decided in 2015 to abandon an offshore oil venture
off the coast of Alaska, which has altered the costbenefit analysis for a deepwater port, at least for the
short-term needs of the energy sector. In the March
2016 Senate hearings, Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works Jo-Ellen Darcy explained that, despite
the cancellation of the Shell project, the construction
of the deepwater port in Nome may be revisited, for
example, to house the Coast Guard’s future new icebreaker.49
As the discussion in a November 2015 congressional hearing on the Arctic attests, broader security considerations have been encroaching of late on policy
discussions of U.S. interests in the Arctic. Members of
Congress repeatedly questioned Admiral Papp, Rear
Admiral Gallaudet of the U.S. Navy, and Vice Admiral
Charles Michel of the U.S. Coast Guard on the Russian
military buildup in the Arctic, linked Chinese access
to the Arctic to their behavior in the South China Sea,
and highlighted the possibility of joint Sino-Russian
activity in the Arctic.50 While noting that Russian actions in Ukraine “have complicated our efforts in the
Arctic” and criticizing Russian aggression there, Admiral Papp emphasized that the United States and
other countries have a successful record of working
with Russia on Arctic issues of mutual interest during previous periods of crisis.51 He further explained,
in response to questions, that what is portrayed as a
“militarization” of the Arctic can be better understood
as a reasonable effort to secure a lengthy waterway—
accounting for half the Arctic—that faces increasing
traffic.52 Rear Admiral Gallaudet added, “in our opinion their intention is primarily economic development
and we feel no threat in the Arctic by the Russians.”53
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Michel further explained that the U.S. Coast Guard has
a good working relationship with the Russian Border
Guards on fisheries and search and rescue issues. Both
Gallaudet and Michel also presented China’s developing role in the Arctic in a positive light. Michel highlighted the cooperative relations between the Chinese
and U.S. Coast Guards, while Gallaudet pointed out
that the September 2015 innocent passage voyage by
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
in U.S. Arctic waters “made a very good case for us to
point to what they are doing in the South China Sea,
and show that that was inconsistent and not following
the rule of law.”54
U.S. FORCES AND MILITARY COOPERATION
IN THE ARCTIC
The U.S. military presence in the Arctic dates from
World War II. A year after the German occupation
of Denmark on June 7, 1941, U.S. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull agreed with the Danish Ambassador to
assume responsibility for the security of Greenland.
This led to the development of weather stations in
various locations there, which proved instrumental in
Allied planning for the Normandy invasion of 1944.
After the war, the United States and Denmark established the Thule Air Base in western Greenland where
600 personnel (from the United States, Denmark,
Greenland, and Canada) provide missile early warning, satellite command and control, and space surveillance capabilities.55 The Alaskan Command (ALCOM)
was created in 1947 in response to lessons learned
from World War II, particularly the need for command
unity, highlighted in the challenges U.S. forces faced
in battles with the Japanese on the Aleutian Islands.
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Responsibility for Alaska’s defense remained split
among the services until a 1987 exercise highlighted
the merits of unified defense for Alaska, which then
moved to PACOM with the exception of air defense.
Alaska NORAD, a component of the North American
Aerospace Defense (NORAD), the U.S.-Canada cooperation effort set up during World War II that went
on to play a key role during the Cold War in missile
defense, is responsible for air security in Alaska.56
The end of the Cold War, the September 11, 2001
(9/11), terrorist attacks, U.S. budgetary constraints,
and changes in U.S. and NATO relations with Russia have led to further reevaluations of the U.S. military presence in the Arctic.57 After the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, NORTHCOM was created and took over responsibility for Alaska’s land and sea defense. With
the more rapid melting of Arctic ice in the 2000s, the
United States has been confronting the need to secure
an entirely new coastline to enable the protection of its
first new ocean since the 19th century.58 The reassignment of responsibility for Alaska’s defense reflects this
change. On October 27, 2014, ALCOM was transferred
from PACOM to NORTHCOM.59
Shifting priorities, namely the growing threats facing the United States in the Middle East and budgetary
constraints, led to the closure in 2006 of the U.S. Naval
air base in Keflavik in southwest Iceland, created in
1951 to monitor Soviet submarine traffic. In light of recent U.S. and NATO tensions with Russia, and against
the background of closer economic ties between an economically weakened Iceland and China, the U.S. Navy
requested funds in its 2017 budget request to upgrade
an aircraft hangar at the base to support increased U.S.
patrols for Russian submarines.60 Similarly, in July
2015, the U.S. Army’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th
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Infantry Division, which operates from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, was supposed to lose
3,000 Soldiers—from 4,000 to approximately 1,050—as
a result of defense budget cuts. By March 2016, Acting Army Secretary Patrick Murphy was arguing that
the brigade was needed and cited Russian aggression,
as well as threats from North Korea and the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), to justify sparing
the 25th Infantry from budget cuts.61 The 4th Brigade
is the Army’s only extreme cold weather brigade and
is an airborne unit, and therefore, is a key component
for rapid response needs in the Arctic and the AsiaPacific region.62 In August 2016, the 4th Brigade participated in Arctic Anvil 2016, the largest Arctic Army
training exercise in 15 years, involving 8,000 personnel
largely from the U.S. Army, but also including some
Canadian forces.63
Meanwhile, in March 2016, the U.S. Navy, led by
the Submarine Forces Command, staged its first Arctic
ice exercise (ICEX) since 2014. Although Navy officials
downplayed any connection between ICEX 2016 and
concerns about Russian policies or military deployments, the 2014 ICEX involved a simulated torpedo
firing against a simulated Akula-class Russian sub.64
While the 2014 ICEX was scheduled prior to Russian
actions in Crimea, the exercise, involving British, Canadian, and Norwegian forces, was meant to reassure
NATO allies, especially in the Baltic region. Nonetheless, these exercises are now biannual and much
less frequent than during the Cold War, when they
occurred three times per year.65
Prior to the Russian conflict with Ukraine, NATO
was opposed to building up military capabilities in
the Arctic, and NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen urged states to cooperate in the region.66 Similarly, a 2015 U.S. Government Accountability Office
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(GAO) report noted that the DoD expected to play a
supporting role in the Arctic given the perceived low
level of threat and the willingness thus far of Arctic
states to cooperate within the framework of the Arctic Council and UNCLOS. Thus, the DoD may assist
the Coast Guard with search and rescue missions or
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
with disaster response.67 Although disputes with other
Arctic states or non-Arctic stakeholders over fisheries
or maritime boundaries could lead to conflict, the 2013
DoD Strategy warns of the danger of militarizing the
Arctic, lest this lead to mistrust and miscommunication. The 2013 Strategy states that there:
is some risk that the perception that the Arctic is being militarized may lead to an ‘arms race mentality’
that could lead to a breakdown of existing cooperative
approaches to shared challenges.68

The 2015 GAO report goes on to discuss the DoD’s
involvement in multilateral security, such as the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable (co-hosted by the United
States and Norway) and the Northern Chiefs of Defense conference, as an example of regional capacity to
address Arctic security issues.69 However, the conflict
between the United States, the European Union (EU),
and Russia over Ukraine has led to the cancellation
of the latter for the past 3 years and the former has
been held without Russian participation. According
to Andreas Østhagen of the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies and the Arctic Institute, “organizing Arctic security without Russia defeats some of
the main purpose why such venues were created.”70
He further notes that while conflict over the Arctic
may be unlikely, a deterioration in relations among
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regional states may lead to conflict within the Arctic
for reasons not connected to the region.71
CHINA’S INTERESTS AND GOALS
IN THE ARCTIC
China’s increasing activity in the Arctic creates
a new area of uncertainty. The Chinese government
has yet to articulate an Arctic strategy and has been
treading cautiously and proceeding incrementally. In
recent years, China has been expanding its trade and
investment ties with northern European states and
improving its polar research capacity.72 After several
attempts, in 2013, China successfully became an observer in the Arctic Council, which Chinese officials
interpreted as recognition of their country’s legitimate
interests in the Arctic. Nonetheless, China’s funding
for its Arctic activities remains relatively modest: 20
percent of $60 million is allocated for all Polar activities.73 China has been engaged in a 5-year assessment
(2012-2016) of polar resources and governance, which
aims to increase China’s status and influence in polar
affairs to better protect its polar rights. These rights
refer to its scientific and economic activities at Svalbard, Norway (where it has had a research station
since 2004), observer status in Arctic Council, access
to Arctic seas and air rights, participation in international governance of Arctic matters, and bidding for
mineral rights.74
To some extent, the ambiguity in Chinese official
positions may be intentional—Chinese officials highlight the need for cooperation with foreign partners,
but use the Arctic issue to speak to nationalist interests at home who fear Chinese exclusion and seek its
rightful place in the world.75 However, some of the
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language used by Chinese commentators, defining
China as a near-Arctic state and a stakeholder in the
region, and referring to its resources as the common
heritage of mankind, has raised fears about Chinese
intentions. Article 32 of the July 1, 2015 Chinese National Security Law outlines the government’s role:
in the peaceful exploration and use of . . . international
seabed areas and polar regions, increasing capacity
for safe passage, scientific investigation, development
and exploitation; strengthening international cooperation, and preserving the security of our nation’s activities and assets in. . . . seabed areas and polar regions,
and other interests.76

While many Chinese analysts argue that China needs
a strategy and should outline one to avoid missing out
on opportunities, others argue that the lack of a strategy will help calm fears in the region about China’s
intentions.
Observers inside and outside China report that
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates its
overall Arctic policy, though they disagree over the
balance of power within the Arctic xitong (grouping
of bureaucracies), with some arguing that the State
Oceanic Administration and state-owned energy and
shipping companies are seeking greater input.77 In October 2015, Foreign Minister Wang Yi issued a video
message to the Arctic Circle Assembly, an open forum
devoted to Arctic issues, in which he outlined respect,
cooperation, and win-win results as the guiding principles of China’s Arctic diplomacy. Regarding respect,
Wang explained:
Respect provides the important basis for China’s participation in Arctic affairs. China respects Arctic coun-

25

tries’ sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction
in the Arctic, and the traditions and culture of Arctic
indigenous people. China also believes that the legitimate concerns of non-Arctic countries and the rights
they enjoy under international law in the Arctic and
the collective interests of the international community
should be respected.78

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming amplified the Foreign Minister’s remarks on a panel at the Arctic Assembly “mandated” by Chinese President Xi Jinping
to present China’s policies, projects, and vision for
the Arctic in response to an invitation by Iceland’s
President, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson.79 Zhang began by
describing China as a “near-Arctic state” and “major
stakeholder in the Arctic,” because of the direct impact
that the Arctic’s environment and resources have on
the environment, climate, agriculture, shipping, trade,
and socio-economic development in China.80 In his
remarks, Zhang outlined six key policies that China
would follow in the Arctic. The first policy was to explore and understand the Arctic through partnerships
between government, academia, business, and social
organizations. The second policy revolved around
protecting the Arctic and developing the regional sustainability. The third policy outlined the need to respect the “inherent rights” of Arctic states, who have
territorial sovereignty, and the culture, traditions, and
lifestyles of indigenous peoples. The fourth policy is
as follows:
Respect the rights of non-Arctic countries and the
overall interests of the international community. The
Arctic seas include high seas and international sea-bed
areas. Non-Arctic countries have the rights to conduct
scientific research, navigation and exploration in the
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Arctic under international law and these rights should
be respected and upheld. The international community must work together to protect and utilize the
Arctic, and in particular to address such global issues
as climate change, ecology, environmental protection
and shipping. At the same time, the overall interests
of the international community in the Arctic should
be respected [emphasis added].81

The fifth policy talked about the need to develop a
multi-tiered governance framework at the global, regional, and national levels, and the need to seek mutually beneficial cooperation.
The challenges in the Arctic require joint contribution
of all stakeholders, including the expertise, technology, capital and market that non-Arctic countries
may offer [emphasis added].82

And lastly, the sixth policy called for supporting the
current governance framework for the Arctic, based
on existing international law (UN Charter, UNCLOS,
Svalbard Treaty, etc.). In light of this framework, “Arctic and non-Arctic countries are entitled to their rights
and also shoulder obligations under international law
[emphasis added].”83 China recognizes the role of organizations such as the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization in Arctic governance.
U.S. and European scholars’ studies identify
China’s objectives as: 1) access to mineral, fish, and
energy resources; 2) new trade routes that shorten
shipping time and provide an alternative to the Malacca Straits; 3) interest in understanding the impact
of climate change on the region; 4) scientific interests
(China’s BeiDou navigational satellite system, space
science, weather forecasting); 5) participation in Arc-
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tic governance; and, 6) calling attention to rights of
non-Arctic states and ensuring that the area that does
not fall in sovereign territory of Arctic states remains
accessible to all.84 Western observers also note that
Chinese officials are concerned about being denied access to Arctic waterways by Arctic states and seek to
internationalize Arctic issues, as opposed to limiting
their scope to immediate Arctic states.85 According to
Anne-Marie Brady, Chinese officials aim for an open
Arctic—where waters are considered open and international, freedom of navigation prevails, and opportunities for resource exploration and environmental
research are open to all.86
In the Arctic, however, there is more than principle
at stake. Chinese shipping predominantly relies on
its own southern ports, and China imports resources
from areas south of the equator. Ports located in areas
north of Shanghai would benefit most from the distance savings offered by Arctic shipping. However,
most of China’s trade with Europe requires containers and, at present, Arctic shipping is not ideal for
container shipping (since it requires precise delivery
dates, which are not possible due to unpredictable
weather conditions in the Arctic). Moreover, China’s
trade with Europe has been declining.87 Opportunities
exist in bulk shipping of natural resources obtained
in Arctic Russia, but the shipping opportunities there
have thus far mainly gone to Russian and European
companies, which have the capacity to work in polar
conditions. Although shorter shipping timeframes
are often mentioned as a rationale for China’s growing involvement in the Arctic, the greatest enthusiasm
for Chinese participation appears to come from the
government and associated researchers who are more
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concerned with China’s role and its access to Arctic
resources, not from Chinese shipping companies.88
There has been a lively scholarly discussion about
China and the Arctic for some years that informs
policymakers, though the views of scholars, while affiliated with government institutions, are diverse and
should not be equated with official policy positions.89
Some Chinese scholars highlight the security rationale
for China’s interest in the Arctic. They call attention to
the importance of maritime security for China and see
Arctic routes as an alternative to the Malacca Strait,90
which they fear provides an opportunity for the
United States and its allies to choke Chinese access to
needed energy supplies from the Persian Gulf. Other
Chinese analysts highlight that the Arctic is situated
at the crossroads between the EU, Eurasia, and the
United States, which houses a ballistic missile interceptor capability at Fort Greely, Alaska that could potentially be directed against China.91 A naval analyst
noted that access to the Arctic would enable China to
break out from Western pressure and emerge on the
world stage.92 Other Chinese scholars view the Arctic
as important to establish China as a regional military
power and to enhance its soft power.93 Scholars from
China’s eastern regions see the Arctic as a way of connecting their areas to the One Belt One Road project
and further expanding China’s energy and transportation networks.94
Citing Sun Tzu, “if you know yourself and know
your enemy, you will be victorious,”95 Chinese scholars point out that in this early stage of China’s Arctic
involvement, when its interests are viewed with some
suspicion, it needs to learn from other states and cooperate with them.96 Due to what some observers term
the “Monroe Doctrine” mentality, Arctic states seek to
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exclude China and other non-Arctic states from key
decisions. For this reason, Chinese experts argue,
China needs to make use of existing governance options, such as its observer status in the Arctic Council,
and deepen other forms of multilateral cooperation,
for example, through the research center on Arctic issues established in Shanghai, and the World Reindeer
Herders’ Congress.97
In their analyses, Chinese experts seek to find ways
for their country to pursue its legitimate interests in
the Arctic without facing undue restrictions. Many
analysts emphasize that China has had longstanding
interests and involvement in the region. Similar to historical rationales for sovereignty in the South China
Sea, Chinese analysts point to historical precedent; in
this case, the Republic of China’s signing of the 1925
Svalbard Treaty, to indicate that China’s interest in the
Arctic is far from new.98 They also point to China’s history of scientific missions in the region.
Moreover, the discussion of how to refer to China
in the Arctic (“non-Arctic state,” “near-Arctic state,”
“non-Arctic coastal state,” or “Arctic stakeholder”) has
attracted as much attention within China as outside it.
Some Chinese scholars argue that “Arctic stakeholder” is the best descriptor for China’s Arctic identity,
in that the term situates the country as a legitimate
participant rather than an external player and opens
the possibility for China to be a responsible and cooperative partner.99 Some also mention that, based on
UNCLOS, the Arctic is a common heritage and should
not be dominated by great powers.100
Defining China’s role in the Arctic represents the
first stage in China’s Arctic policy, writes Sun Kai, an
Arctic scholar at the Ocean University of China. The
next phase is to elaborate what China should do in its
Arctic diplomacy.101 Sun Kai highlights climate change
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and the economy as two areas where China would face
few barriers to its Arctic diplomacy, and he argues
that China should promote its role in these areas by
participating in new approaches to Arctic governance,
cooperating widely (with Arctic and non-Arctic states,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and companies), and engaging in Track 2 dialogue.102
Chinese analysts note that Arctic governance is in
its infancy and suggest that this provides an opportunity for China to be a rule-maker, for example, to protect its fishing and shipping interests.103 Others note
that since the Arctic Council was established relatively recently, this provides China with an opportunity
to socialize other members about China’s role, as well
as for China to learn more about Arctic governance.104
China’s relatively weak position in the Arctic often
comes up in Chinese academic discussions of China’s
role in the region and, for some analysts, provides the
primary short-term rationale for China’s active involvement as an observer within the Arctic Council.105
In the long term, according to some scholars, China’s
best strategy is to reduce barriers to China’s participation by supporting existing laws and green development, while enhancing its own position in the Arctic
by building its military, economic, and technological
capacity to operate in the area and developing new
legal approaches.106 Some analysts chafe at the limitations involved in observer status in the Arctic Council
given China’s great power role,107 while others suggest China should develop new multilateral initiatives
for Arctic governance in cooperation with states, such
as a global maritime cooperation center that would
address Arctic issues.108
Chinese scholarly analyses of Arctic politics view
geopolitics as well as regional governance as key drivers.109 Chinese academics and military analysts have
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discussed the prospect of great power conflict and
militarization in the Arctic for some years, and this
concern is not specifically a response to more recent
U.S.-Russian tensions, though these have magnified
or given additional credence to longstanding fears
over the spillover of great power competition into the
Arctic.110
Chinese experts generally advise against their
country being drawn into U.S.-Russian military competition in the Arctic, though Yang Zhirong of the
PLAN’s Naval War College observed that the melting
ice reduced the distance between great powers in the
region and increased its strategic importance.111 He
noted that both the United States and Russia had a
military component to their Arctic strategy and urged
China to do the same. This would involve dedicating
naval staff to Arctic affairs, as well as informationgathering, developing Arctic-capable equipment, improving communication in the region, making ports of
call visits, and more generally to recognize the strategic value of the Arctic. Yang pointed out that had Russia had access to it in 1904, this would have enabled it
to direct more resources against Japan.112
Chinese experts note that most regional states,
including the United States, seek mutually beneficial
cooperation. Some Chinese analysts are more suspicious of U.S. aims in the Arctic and urge vigilance,113
while others see U.S. economic interests in the region
counterbalancing militarization and promoting multilateralism.114 Chinese scholars see opportunities for
their country to work with the United States on Arctic
issues, though some caution against “leaning to one
side” due to the Sino-Russian partnership. An analysis of China’s policy toward the U.S. chairmanship
of the Arctic Council suggests bright prospects for
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Sino-American cooperation in areas of priority to the
United States, including climate change, improving
living conditions in Arctic communities, and improving Arctic Ocean safety, security, and stewardship.
The author, Ye Jiang, a senior research fellow at the
Shanghai Institute for International Studies, highlights China’s record of scientific research on climate
change in the Arctic, as well as its participation in several Arctic Council working groups on environmental
issues, and active role in the International Maritime
Organization’s efforts to develop a Polar Code to
improve Arctic shipping safety.115
CHINA’S ARCTIC DIPLOMACY
Canada and Russia reportedly were the two
countries most skeptical about China’s entry into
the Arctic Council as an observer, due their concern
over Chinese recognition of their sovereignty claims
over Arctic waters. A 2011 survey concluded that
Canadians displayed the lowest level of support for
including non-Arctic states in the Arctic Council.116
Canadian scholars largely agree that China’s interests
and goals in the western Arctic focus on shipping, research, and resource development, though they differ
in their assessments of China’s broader intentions in
the Arctic. Some analysts, such as Frédéric Lasserre
of the University of Laval in Québec, view China’s
aims within the context of rising global interest in
new shipping routes and see China’s prospective role
in the region as potentially advantageous for Canada
in terms of cooperation in natural resource development, scientific collaboration, or tourism.117 Other
scholars, such as David Wright and Rob Huebert,
both from the University of Calgary, are suspicious
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about China’s broader geopolitical aims in the Arctic,
including access to resources and diluting Canadian
sovereignty.118 P. Whitney Lackenbauer and James
Manicom refute these interpretations, arguing that
there are no grounds for asserting that China would
reject Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage.119
On April 5, 2016, the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, subordinate to China’s Transport Ministry, released a 365-page guidance on navigation in
the Northwest Passage in an effort to promote the
route as weather conditions enable its greater use for
trade.120 A 2014 voyage of the Canadian ore-carrier,
Nunavik, from Quebec to Northeastern China, traveled 40 percent faster via the Northwest Passage than
through the Panama Canal route. However, weather
conditions still remain too uncertain for container
shipping to be profitable along this route, which is
more challenging for navigation than the NSR. Moreover, Chinese observers note that, for now, multiple
permissions from Canadian governmental authorities
complicate commercial use of the Northwest Passage,
compared to Russia’s more streamlined process with
the NSR Administration. Canada also lacks Russia’s
large icebreaker fleet, and Canada’s transportation
infrastructure is relatively undeveloped in the Northwest Passage area, raising the risks in case of an accident or spill.121
As the Northwest Passage becomes navigable, the
key question is whether or not the Chinese government will acknowledge Canadian sovereignty and
request permission before sailing on what Canada
considers to be its internal sea. The United States considers the waterway to be an international strait that
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accords all ships transit passage.122 At an April 20, 2016
press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua
Chunying sidestepped the issue:
China noted that Canada considers this route as internal waters, while some countries believe it was open
for international navigation. We also noted that Canada has imposed some restrictions on the use of the
Northwest Passage, asking foreign vessels to inform
the Canadian side and get permission before entering
or crossing its exclusive economic zone and territorial
waters. The Chinese side will make appropriate decisions by taking into account various factors.123

China’s position on Canadian sovereignty over
Arctic waters potentially affects U.S. interests in the
region. The issue of sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage as well as the Beaufort Sea has also complicated U.S.-Canadian relations, though the visit of newly
elected Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to
Washington in March 2016 appeared to usher in a
new era of cooperation. The United States and Canada
called for an international agreement to regulate fishing in the increasingly ice-free open Arctic, beyond the
established economic zones of Arctic coastal states.124
Although, like Canada, Russia claims sovereignty
over the NSR, the Arctic waters above its territory,
Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic has been deepening of late. In November 2015, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei, defined China’s
interests in the Arctic as they affect Sino-Russian relations as follows:
China is an important stakeholder in the Arctic. China’s participation in Arctic affairs has always been
guided by three major principles: respect, cooperation
and win-win results. We would like to enhance our
communication and cooperation with all stakeholders
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in Arctic affairs to jointly promote peace, stability and
sustainable development of the Arctic region. Russia
is a major country in the Arctic area and has significant influence on Arctic affairs. China-Russia Arctic
cooperation enjoys sound basis. We stand ready to
strengthen our exchanges and cooperation on Arctic
affairs with the Russian side.125

As successive rounds of Western economic sanctions against Russia have an impact on the Russian
energy industry, Russia is increasingly relying on
China financially to develop energy resources in the
Arctic. A $12 billion loan from China in April 2016
enabled Russia to move forward with its Yamal LNG
project, for example, despite Western sanctions.126 At
the same time, China is wary of efforts by Russia to
claim sovereignty to the Lomonosov Ridge, dividing
the Eurasian and the Amerasian basins of the Arctic Ocean, which would limit Chinese access to the
region.
For Russia, the development of the Arctic is a strategic priority. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Arctic is “a concentration of practically
all aspects of national security—military, political,
economic, technological, environmental and that of
resources.”127 Russia first issued a comprehensive Arctic strategy in 2008, The Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic Until 2020 and Beyond,
and then in 2013 outlined, Russian Strategy of the Development of the Arctic Zone and the Provision of National
Security until 2020.128 According to these documents,
Russia’s objectives in the Arctic are:
• Development of the Arctic zone as a strategic
resource base;
• Economic development to resolve socioeconomic development problems; and,
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• Development of the NSR for shipping and
transportation.
As melting ice in the Arctic facilitates energy exploration, China finds itself at a disadvantage, since these
energy resources are largely located on the territory
of Arctic states. Moreover, China lacks the cold water expertise necessary for exploration and has done
little research, compared to Western oil majors, on the
geology of Arctic energy resources.129 Nonetheless,
the Arctic is important to Chinese strategic calculations of its long-term energy security. A 2014 report
by a research institute affiliated with the Chinese PLA
portrayed the Arctic as a potential “lifeline” for the
growing Chinese economy and urged greater energy
cooperation with Arctic countries.130
Consequently, China has viewed resource cooperation with Russia in the Arctic with great interest.
As Sino-Russian energy deals progressed in 2013, Chinese and Russian companies moved forward on a series of ventures in the Arctic, including exploring joint
development projects between Rosneft and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the Barents
and Pechora Seas, as well as a LNG deal between the
private gas company Novatek and CNPC for 3 million tons annually in gas deliveries from Yamal over
a 15-year period.131 Novatek ultimately agreed to sell
CNPC a 20 percent stake in the Yamal LNG project
and the deal was signed during Putin’s May 2014 visit
to China. According to the deal, CNPC would bring
in 30 percent of the investment funds needed for the
project and bring in other investors.132 In 2014, CNPC
purchased a 10 percent share in the Vankor oil and
gas projects, the largest field discovered in the past
25 years. The Indian company, Oil and Natural Gas
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Corporation Limited (ONGC), purchased a 15 percent
stake in September 2015, and CNPC was reportedly
considering additional investments. Also in September 2015, China Oil Services Limited, a subsidiary of
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC),
agreed to drill two wells in the Sea of Okhotsk for a
joint venture between Rosneft and Norway’s Statoil.
As Alexander Gabuev noted, since the imposition
of sanctions on Russia as a result of the conflict in
Ukraine, Russian officials have become more receptive to Chinese investments in strategic sectors, such
as oil and gas, as well as in infrastructure.133 Moreover,
the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, which China sees as seeking to constrain its rise, and tensions with the United
States and other countries in the South China Sea,
have contributed to greater overall Chinese interest in
cooperating with Russia, including in the Arctic.134
Nonetheless, many domestic and international factors will affect progress in Sino-Russian Arctic energy
deals, including international sanctions against Russia
as a result of its actions in Ukraine, the low oil price,
and China’s economic downturn and the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, which has affected the ranks
of CNPC. Thus the $20 billion loan that the CNPC—
a state-owned firm that lost senior officials to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign—initially pledged
to Novatek (headed by a Gennadii Timchenko who is
a close friend of Putin and now under Western sanctions) for the Yamal LNG project first shrank to $15
billion, then was never provided.135 Instead, China’s
state-run Silk Road Fund purchased a 9.9 percent
stake in the project.136 Novatek ultimately secured
the remaining $12 billion in needed external funding
from the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank, which typically are used for funding
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politically important projects and are less connected
to global markets.137 European banks are reluctant
to fund Russian Arctic energy projects in light of the
sanctions, making funding from China all the more
important.138
After the first voyage by a Chinese commercial
ship along the NSR in 2013, Yang Huigen, Director of
China’s Polar Shipping Institute, optimistically predicted that anywhere from 5-15 percent of China’s
trade could use the route by 2020.139 Certainly, the
prospects of greater shipping along this route have
encouraged Sino-Russian cooperation in certain areas. Building on Sino-Russian energy cooperation, in
2010, Sovkomflot and CNPC signed an agreement on
shipping oil along the NSR and providing training for
the Chinese in arctic navigation.140 Chinese companies
are providing financing for infrastructure projects, for
example, to facilitate coal shipments from Verkhoyansk Yakutiya to Shanghai.141 The Chinese firm, Poly
Technologies, is building a rail link from Archangelsk
to the mining areas in the Urals and is interested in
building a deepwater port in Archangelsk.142
There has also been some talk of involving the
Russian Far East port of Zarubino in shipment of LNG
from the Yamal fields, which would potentially facilitate Arctic LNG exports to the Asia-Pacific region,
as well as to advance a long-sought goal by China’s
northeastern provinces to enhance infrastructure links
between northern China and the Russian Far East.
One Russian observer cautions, however, that this is
a “phantom” project, in that budgetary woes have
postponed indefinitely the implementation of a 2014
agreement by Russia’s Summa Group with the Jilin
province to build a deepwater port in Zarubino.143
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Moreover, some Chinese claims about Arctic shipping are not supported by the facts. If, as stated earlier, one goal of the NSR is to improve energy security
by overcoming their “Malacca dilemma” (that is, its
fear of the U.S. closing of a key choke point of China’s
energy trade), the narrow passage through the Bering Straits is unlikely to improve the security picture
much.144 Turning to shipping itself, some Chinese
scholars overstate the potential benefits of Arctic shipping and downplay its difficulties. For example, Guo
Weiping of the Ocean University of China spoke of
the northern shipping route as having the potential to
“change the structure of global trade.”145
Much like northeastern Chinese provinces seized
on the Deng Xiaoping era concept of special economic
zones to promote their regional interests, scholars from
this part of China today view the Arctic route as a way
of becoming involved in and benefiting from the One
Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Thus, other scholars
from the Dalian Ocean University in Liaoning province (in Northeastern China) argue that combining
the new shipping possibilities in the Arctic with the
OBOR initiative would have important consequences
for the “greater Arctic.”146 Nonetheless, Chinese shipping companies have been as cautious as their Western counterparts have, and shipping along the NSR
has thus far proceeded slowly. While exports of Arctic
resources from Russia to China have been increasing
gradually, Russian ships have largely been used to
transport them. A recent survey of Chinese shipping
companies showed that they were more interested in
having access to the resources than in transiting shipments, due to the high risks and costs associated with
Arctic shipping today.147
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Although the impact of climate change in the
Arctic on China is an important piece of the Chinese
government’s interest in the region, China is a relative
newcomer to Arctic research. Thus far, China has been
involved in seven scientific expeditions to the Arctic.
Its seventh mission, now completed, had launched in
July 2016, and involved French and American scientists.148 In the future, China plans to cooperate with
Russian scientists in a joint mission.149 The two countries have yet to cooperate in Arctic research, though
U.S. and Russian scholars have been cooperating in
this area for many years and continue to do so despite
political tensions.150
While cooperation has been proceeding between
Russia and China in the Arctic, their interaction is
complicated in this region by several factors. First, unlike any other sphere of their joint activity, this region
is one where China finds itself in a relatively weak
position compared to Russia. Russia has the advantage of being a coastal Arctic state with all of its attributes—territory, coastline, and indigenous people.
China has none of these, not being physically located
in or even near the Arctic. As one interesting analysis
by Chinese scholars points out, this has an impact on
the extent of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region.
According to the authors, their cooperation is greatest in areas where China has the most to offer—in the
area of resources—where China can be an investor
and a buyer. The two countries also have shared interests in environmental protection and climate research,
so there is the potential for cooperation there (though
this has yet to happen). In other areas, such as shipping (where Russia is in a much stronger position),
or military cooperation, the authors see limited prospects for cooperation.151 Consequently, the authors
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conclude that China will only be able to achieve its
goals in the Arctic with Russian cooperation, and that
Russia’s attitude toward Chinese participation will be
important.152 Others note that Russia’s assistance will
be needed for China to play the role it desires in the
Arctic. Li and Zhang claim, for example, that the voyage of the Chinese icebreaker Snow Dragon in 2012 was
only possible with Russian help because both Russia
and the United States outpace China in technology,
as well as in shipping data and navigation training,
needed for the Arctic.153 Moreover, until China has
the icebreaker capability to operate independently
of Russia in non-Russian areas of the Arctic, this will
constrain China’s ability to take advantage of any cost
savings involved in Arctic passage and avoid Russian
icebreaker escort fees.154
Although China succeeded in joining the Arctic
Council in 2013, Russia initially was opposed. According to the U.S. diplomatic reporting released by
WikiLeaks, Russia viewed the Arctic as its sphere of
influence and favored an Arctic Council limited to Arctic states.155 A number of reasons have been suggested
for Russia’s initial opposition to China’s inclusion in
the body: 1) the importance of the Arctic for Russian
national security and the history of Arctic Russia as
a zone closed to foreigners;156 2) lack of clarity about
China’s Arctic goals;157 and, 3) reluctance to admit
members with purely economic aims.158 Both Canada
and Russia, the countries with the longest Arctic borders, pressed for changes in the Arctic Council rules,
requiring members to adhere to UNCLOS and the
sovereign rights of Arctic states, as well as a new stipulation for a review of the status of observers every
4 years. When these were passed in 2011, this paved
the way for the entry of China and several other nonArctic states as observers in 2013.159
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Prior to admission to the Arctic Council, some Chinese officials made statements that caused alarm in
Russia. For example, in 2009, Deputy Foreign Minister
Hu Zhengyue referred to the Arctic as the “common
heritage of mankind.”160 In 2010, Admiral Yin Zhuo of
the PLAN stated, “the Arctic does not belong to any
particular nation and is rather the property of all the
world’s people” and argued that, based on its population, China should play an “indispensable role” in
developing the region.161 Since its admission as an
observer to the Arctic Council, China has pledged
to respect the sovereignty of Arctic states and follow
UNCLOS with respect to Arctic seas, but Arctic states
have the right to deny it some aspects of freedom of
navigation on the grounds of reciprocity, as China
does not recognize certain rights in its own coastal
seas. The issues that may affect China’s Arctic rights
are its positions on foreign warships in its territorial
sea, the routing of foreign cables, and foreign installations and structures on its continental shelf.162
Chinese scholars note the historical, geographic,
and economic factors underlying Russian positions on
Arctic sovereignty, which may serve to limit China’s
role.163 Indeed, Russia has sought to demonstrate its
sovereignty in a variety of ways, most dramatically
in 2007 by planting a Russian flag on the Arctic shelf.
At times Russia has proved willing to negotiate, as in
2010 when Russia and Norway ended their 40-year
dispute over their boundary in the Barents Sea.164 In
February 2016, the Russian government submitted its
claim to 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic seabed to the UN, including the shelf beneath the North
Pole. This claim places Russia at odds with Canada
over Arctic sovereignty.165 Russia has been asserting
this claim since 2002, but it was rejected previously for
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technical reasons.166 All signatories to UNCLOS have
the right to submit claims within 10 years of their ratification. The United States, which has not yet ratified
the treaty, is thus unable to file any claims.
While shared norms about global politics bring
Russia and China together on many global issues,167
Russia’s Arctic identity and China’s emerging identity
as a great power drive them apart on Arctic affairs. For
Russia, the Arctic has assumed an important ideological importance in contemporary Russian nationalist
narratives and related efforts to restore Russian greatness.168 China, under Xi Jinping, has espoused an opportunistic worldview, and the Chinese President has
urged his fellow citizens instead to showcase China’s
successes, take advantage of strategic opportunities,
and strive for achievement (fen fa you wei 奋发有为).169
This is a marked departure from the Deng Xiaoping
era practice of keeping a low profile and downplaying
capabilities to focus on domestic economic reform (tao
guang yang hui 韬光养晦). Because of China’s weaker
position as an outsider in the Arctic, however, its opportunities lie in its interactions with smaller Arctic
states, and opportunism is likely to be counterproductive in working cooperatively with Russia and other
large Arctic states, Chinese scholars note.170 Chinese
leaders also play to a nationalistic audience at home,
which is keen to relive China’s age of exploration and
is attentive to any slights by foreign countries. According to Polar scholar Anne-Marie Brady, “China talks
down its interests in the Arctic to foreign audiences,
meanwhile talking them up to domestic audiences.”171
Other obstacles to Sino-Russian cooperation in the
Arctic are more practical. The high-risk and high-cost
energy projects face new challenges in light of Western sanctions on Russia (which limit Russia’s access
to needed technology, expertise, and investment), the
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low price of oil, and China’s economic downturn and
anti-corruption drive (which has hit CNPC, a partner
in Russian Arctic projects).172 Moreover, the practicality of Sino-Russian cooperation in these energy projects will also depend on the feasibility of transportation of the LNG from the Arctic to China.
While Canada and Russia have had some reservations about a greater Chinese role in the Arctic, Nordic
countries have largely welcomed China’s growing interest in the Arctic, as long as it adheres to UNCLOS
on sovereignty and respects the rules and norms set by
the Arctic Council. China invested considerable political capital in this effort, including visits by top leaders.
In 2012, Hu Jintao made the first Chinese presidential
visit to Denmark; and Wen Jiabao visited Sweden and
Iceland, the first visit by a Chinese Prime Minister in
several decades.173 For the most part, Nordic states
have understood Chinese motivations as commercial,
though there were negative reactions to some Chinese
investment plans in Iceland and Greenland.174
In the case of Iceland, fears turned out to be overblown. Although China signed its first free trade agreement (FTA) with the European state Iceland (which is
not a part of the EU), and built a large new embassy in
the capital, only five Chinese staff serve there, though
some reports contend the mission could accommodate
100 times that number.175 A bid by a Chinese investor,
Huang Nubo, to purchase land in Iceland, allegedly
for a golf course, was eventually rejected.176 The disappearance in 2014 of China’s Ambassador to Iceland,
who was later accused of being a Japanese spy, further
fueled suspicions about China.177 Although certain
sectors of Iceland’s economy (e.g., geothermal energy
and fishing) stand to gain from cooperation with China, public opinion on the new economic ties is decid-
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edly mixed. A 2015 study showed lukewarm support
for engagement with China, with 32 percent supporting, 34 percent opposed, and 34 percent neutral.178 The
study revealed the greatest support for collaborative
scientific research, and the most concern over the reputational effects of cooperation with China due to its
poor record on human rights, environmental protection, and labor issues, including the use of underpaid
Chinese workers in previous projects to build two
dams in Iceland.
Iceland, which faced a severe economic crisis in
2008, welcomed investment from China and saw an
opportunity to develop economic relations with the
country. This involved a $500 million currency swap
deal in 2010, as well as investments in offshore energy.
In return, Iceland became an enthusiastic supporter of
China’s entry into the Arctic Council, and now Iceland
also hosts the Arctic Circle Assembly as a vehicle for
open discussion of Arctic issues. For China, Iceland
could become an important shipping hub and research
base for its activities in the Arctic region.179 China and
Iceland are cooperating in building a joint facility to
study the Northern Lights, funded by the Polar Research Institute of China, which has raised concern
about China’s potential use of the facility to track
NATO flight movements. In 2014, Iceland’s National
Energy Authority granted a consortium including: the
CNOOC, Iceland’s Eyki Corporation, and Norway’s
Petoro, a license to explore for hydrocarbons on Iceland’s northeast continental shelf.180 China and Iceland also have developed substantial cooperation in
geothermal energy and in mining for ferrosilicium, a
key element of solar panels.181
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China’s ties with Greenland have also elicited concern, as the country seeks to develop its mining industry as a way of gaining further political autonomy
from Denmark—Chinese investment may well be the
vehicle for Greenland’s independence. This would
have important security consequences for U.S. basing
rights and missile defense systems in the area.
In 2009, Greenland was granted self-rule from
Denmark, which includes the right to develop its own
resources as well as the right to independence.182 For
now, Greenland faces many economic and political
challenges and remains a part of Denmark; therefore,
it currently remains under NATO’s umbrella.
After the Mineral Resources Act was passed in
2010, granting Greenland the rights to revenue earned
through mining, the territory began reaching out to
Chinese mining companies. Additional legislation,
the Large Scale Project Act, gave Greenland the right
to bring in foreign workers that led to concerns about
the possibility of a major influx of Chinese workers in
mining projects having a destabilizing effect on their
environment under discussion.183 Thus far, China has
been involved in three mining projects in Greenland
since 2009. Its first investment in the Arctic Circle
involved Jiangxi Union, a consortium of companies
(including Jiangxi Copper, one of the world’s largest
copper mining companies), in a venture prospecting for copper, zinc, and lead in eastern Greenland.
Although this investment was significant, as it was
China’s first in the area, the low price of copper has
limited its scope.184
The second investment, involving Chinese participation in a British iron-mining venture (London Mining), proved more controversial due to reports that it
would employ 2,000 Chinese workers who would be
exempt from Greenland’s labor standards. This ven47

ture also exacerbated fears of China gaining control
over the country’s rich resource base.185 London Mining eventually went bankrupt and a Hong Kong company, General Nice, that has ties to mining interests
in central China, purchased its assets in January 2015.
Although this is the first Arctic resource investment
falling under Chinese control, the current low price of
iron has made development of the Isua mine in Greenland unprofitable for now.186
The third investment, involving rare earths, has
broader significance both within Greenland and geopolitically. China Nonferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering and Construction Company, Limited
(NFC), a Chinese state-owned company, first became
involved in Greenland in 2011 in a joint venture to develop a zinc mine in the northeast of the territory. In
2014, the NFC signed a memorandum of understanding with a company in Greenland to develop rare
earths and uranium mining in Kvanefjeld in southern
Greenland.187 Domestically, opponents of the project
point to the environmental consequences, the tradeoff between development and seeking United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) World Heritage Site status for the area to
be mined (the site of a farming community since the
days of the Vikings in the 10th century), and the impact on indigenous communities. There has also been
opposition to the use of foreign workers, processing
resources overseas, as well as to uranium mining more
broadly (in 2013, legislation banning the extraction of
radioactive materials was repealed). Geopolitically,
the project has attracted controversy as developed
countries seek to counter China’s dominance over the
rare earths market by acquiring alternative sources of
supply. For Greenland, however, investment by nonEU companies, including Chinese firms, provides a
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boost for its efforts toward political autonomy from
Denmark.
THE ARCTIC IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
The Arctic is one of the few regions of the world
where China finds itself at a disadvantage at present. Unlike the South China Sea or the Mekong River
basin, where China is in a strong position relative to
other states in the region and displays a preference for
bilateral initiatives over multilateral ones, in the Arctic, the Chinese government takes the opposite tack,
seeking to enhance multilateralism and displaying a
preference for inclusive norms. For this reason, China
sought to join the Arctic Council, the primary governance organization for the region, as an observer.
Twelve non-Arctic states now have observer status, including seven European countries (France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and Italy), as well as five Asian states (China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and India).
Eleven intergovernmental and nine NGOs also have
observer status.188 Observers are included provisionally in the activities of the Arctic Council, “for such
time as consensus exists among Ministers [of Arctic
states].”189 Observers participate in the activities of
the Arctic Council’s working groups, may submit
related documents, and participate in particular projects along with Arctic states, as long as their financial
contribution does not exceed that of Arctic states, unless the latter decide otherwise. The provisional status
of Arctic observers stems from the authority of Arctic states to terminate the observer status of a state
which “engages in activities that are at odds” with
the Arctic Council’s founding declaration or rules of
procedure.190
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China had applied for admission in 2007, some
years before rapidly melting ice in the Arctic made
greater participation in the economic development of
the region by extra-regional actors a possibility. Discussion of its application was deferred until 2011, by
which time a number of other countries had requested
observer status, including the EU, India, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, and Singapore, as well as a number of
NGOs. The issue of admitting observers led to lengthy
discussions among Arctic Council members, and no
decision was reached until the May 2013 meeting.191
Despite restrictions on the participation of observer states, China’s admission was particularly controversial and its interest in the Arctic Council has raised
many questions for the international community, including the United States. One aspect of this was the
possibility that large global players from outside the
Arctic region would be able to dominate the Arctic
Council.192 Another concern is that the inclusion of
outside great powers would lead to the militarization
of the Arctic and bring their bilateral conflicts—SinoIndian or Sino-Japanese tensions, for example—to
the Arctic Council, thereby impeding regional consensus.193 An April 2016 trilateral meeting on Arctic
affairs, involving South Korea, Japan, and China,
sought to reduce this prospect and enhance communication among the three Arctic Council observers.194
The three countries also cooperate in the framework of
the North Pacific Arctic Conference, an annual Track
2 undertaking that is co-sponsored by the East-West
Center and the Korean Maritime Institute.195
Currently observers from outside the Arctic do in
fact outnumber Arctic states, though their role is limited by the organization’s rules, as noted above. Inflammatory statements by certain Chinese officials about
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their country’s role in the Arctic, China’s economic
ties with Iceland (weakened by economic crisis), and
resource deals by Chinese companies in the Arctic
served to further suspicions about Chinese intentions
in the Arctic Council and the region more broadly.
Canada and Russia, despite its strategic partnership with China, were the most resistant to granting
China observer status. For Russia, it was imperative
that all Arctic Council participants recognize Russian
sovereignty in the Arctic, particularly its maritime
sovereignty. Russia also sought to restrict decisionmaking to the five Arctic coastal states—the 2008
Russian Arctic policy document even omitted Arctic Council members Sweden, Finland, and Iceland
from the group of states identified as having Arctic
borders.196 In a 2013 interview with Norwegian television, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev asserted that
while it was reasonable that several countries outside
the region joined the Arctic Council, and that Russia
trusted China and wanted to cooperate with it, “the
regulations operating in the Arctic Region should be
governed by the Arctic States themselves.”197 This was
less than a year before the Russian takeover of Crimea,
however, and since the imposition of sanctions by the
EU and the United States, which have complicated
Russia’s quest for investment in its Arctic regions,
Russia has become much more open to economic participation by Asian states, including China, in the region. In August 2015, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
welcomed the participation of Arctic Council observer
states in the economic projects approved by the forum,
but referred to China as a “priority partner” for Arctic projects in resources, science, and technology. In
Lavrov’s view, China and Russia should collaborate
bilaterally in the Arctic, not just within the scope of
Arctic Council projects.198
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While Russia reportedly was more concerned about
the EU becoming an observer of the Arctic Council—
that would greatly enhance European influence over
the forum since EU states were already members and
observers—Canada was more concerned about the impact of Asian observer states, particularly China.199 For
Canada, as for Russia, recognition of its sovereignty,
particularly over the Northwest Passage, and respect
for the rights of indigenous peoples are key priorities
that the Canadian government wants to see observer
states recognize. Moreover, given Canada’s leading
role in the creation of the Arctic Council, Canadians
have been resistant to moves to “internationalize” the
forum and dilute the jurisdiction and authority of Arctic states and peoples over their own affairs.200
While the Nordic Arctic Council member states
share Russian and Canadian concerns about observer
states recognizing their sovereignty and authority
over Arctic matters, Nordic countries have been more
welcoming of Asian observer states, including China.
Unlike Canada and Russia, Nordic states recognize
the global economic and commercial interests in the
Arctic. With Asian shipping and resource companies
already interested and investing in the region, Nordic
Arctic Council members preferred to involve Asian
states in the forum and ensure their commitment to
Arctic norms rather than see these non-Arctic countries coalesce outside of the body in support of narrower interests.201 China has sought to build on the
warmer reception by the Nordic States to expand its
soft power in the region and further legitimize its
claim to be an Arctic stakeholder by proposing and
developing the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center
in Shanghai to further cooperation between scholars
from China and Nordic Arctic states. The new center
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opened in December 2013 to support joint research on
climate change, Arctic economic development, and
shipping.202
The U.S. position was somewhere in-between Canadian and Russian wariness and Northern European
inclusiveness. Before the 2013 meeting that decided
on the inclusion of China and other Asian observers, an American official told the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) that the United States was open to
observers and considered China to be a responsible
applicant.203 Moreover, China’s observer status in
the Arctic Council would provide Secretary of State
John Kerry with an additional forum within which to
engage China (as well as India) on climate change, a
key priority for the Obama administration. Nonetheless, some U.S. officials admitted to sharing some of
the concerns expressed by Canada and Russia, though
they noted the difficulty of supporting the admission
of allies like Japan and South Korea, but not China.204
According to Leiv Lunde, a Norwegian scholar
and former official in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States was undecided until
the very last moment about granting observer status
to China.205 After a spirited dinner debate at the 2013
Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, Secretary
of State Kerry reportedly brokered a compromise that
paved the way for the admission of China and several
other states as observers.206 The compromise involved
requiring observers to agree to specific rules for their
conditional participation, particularly recognizing
the sovereignty of Arctic states and UNCLOS as the
determining legal framework.207 According to the
Arctic Council’s manual Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, for observers to be admitted they must abide by
what one expert has termed the “seven Arctic Council
commandments:”208
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1. Accepts and supports the objectives of the Arctic
Council defined in the Ottawa declaration;
2. Recognizes Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign
rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic;
3. Recognizes that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the
Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides
a solid foundation for responsible management of
this ocean;
4. Respects the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants;
5. Has demonstrated a political willingness as well
as financial ability to contribute to the work of the
Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples;
6. Has demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Arctic Council; and,
7. Has demonstrated a concrete interest and ability
to support the work of the Arctic Council, including through partnerships with member states and
Permanent Participants bringing Arctic concerns
to global decision-making bodies.209

Another analysis argues that there was no opposition within the United States or other Arctic states to
China per se becoming an observer of the Arctic Council, but to having additional extra-regional observers
in general, with bigger powers seeing the Arctic as a
domestic issue, not a global one.210 Privately, however,
some U.S. officials convey some continued skepticism
about China’s long-term intentions in the Arctic—for
example, its potential to exploit economic weakness in
the Nordic states or to take advantage of opportunities to engage in scientific research to improve antisubmarine warfare capabilities—while others argue
that it is preferable to include China in discussions of
Arctic governance to encourage its compliance.211
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During former President Obama’s visit to Alaska
in early September 2015, the PLAN sent five warships
into U.S. territorial waters in the Bering Sea (within
12 miles of the Aleutian Islands) to exercise their right
of innocent passage according to UNCLOS.212 This
means that the ships have the right to traverse the
area as long as they do not engage in any activities
that may cause a threat to security, such as military
exercises or intelligence gathering, or take any other
actions (fishing, research, etc.) beyond sailing through
the area. The ships (three surface combatants, an amphibious warship, and an oiler) were part of a group
of seven that had participated in a joint naval exercise
with Russia in August. Although it was an unusual
coincidence that the Chinese ships appeared in the
Bering Strait for the first time during Obama’s visit to
the area, the passage of the PLAN ships more likely
was timed to coincide with Chinese celebrations of the
70th anniversary of World War II—China’s military
parade began just hours after the ships were sighted in
U.S. waters—and the lead up to President Xi Jinping’s
visit to the United States later in September 2015.213
The U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council provides additional opportunities to engage China on areas of common concern, such as climate change. In the
short term, the international community has struggled
to move forward with agreements to address climate
change that are palatable to developed and developing countries alike. A Chinese delegation attended the
GLACIER conference, but China (as well as India and
Russia) refused to sign the non-binding declaration
calling for more effort to address climate change, raising questions about China’s position on the balance of
interests between protecting the Arctic environment,
and developing its resources.214 According to one Chi-
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nese media report, the Chinese government needed
more time to study the document in preparation for
the November 2015 Paris climate talks, though a Russian analysis suggested that China, India, and Russia
shared concerns about the economic costs of measures
to address climate change.215
In October 2015, the Arctic States agreed to develop cooperation in the Arctic among their Coast Guard
agencies with the creation of the Arctic Coast Guard
Forum.216 As a non-Arctic state, China is not a member
of this group, but the United States cooperates with the
Chinese Coast Guard through the North Pacific Coast
Guard Forum, which also includes Canada, Japan,
Russia, and the Republic of Korea. The North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum, which served as a model for the
Arctic Coast Guard Forum, holds bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve maritime safety and security and develop procedures for various contingencies. Additionally, the U.S. and Chinese Coast Guards
reportedly are finalizing the details of an agreement to
improve their communication. The agreement under
discussion would be similar to the 2014 multilateral
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea the two countries have signed, which seeks to avoid miscommunication among navies.
Since 1993, the United States and China have been
cooperating in patrolling the northern Pacific Ocean
for high seas driftnet fishing in an effort to implement
UN General Assembly Resolution 46/215 that prohibits the practice. The U.S.-China memorandum on
cooperation in this area is known as the U.S.-China
Shiprider Agreement because it outlines procedures
for Chinese officials to board U.S. Coast Guard vessels
to improve communication and enforcement of the
prohibition against driftnet fishing. This agreement
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also allows law enforcement officials of either country
to board and inspect a U.S. or Chinese flagged ship
suspected of driftnet fishing.217 For example, the U.S.
and Chinese Coast Guards cooperated in June 2014 in
apprehending a Chinese vessel, the Yi Yuan, that was
engaged in large-scale illegal driftnet fishing.218
In November 2015, U.S. Special Representative
for the Arctic Admiral Papp testified to the House
of Representatives on U.S. Arctic priorities. Among
them was the effort to prevent unregulated fishing in
international waters in the Central Arctic Ocean. Currently, there is no commercial fishing in this area, but
climate change may alter the situation in the future.
The United States passed a law in 2009 banning fishing in its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north
of the Bering Strait until there was sufficient information about fish stocks in the area. Canada also passed
a similar law in 2014. Both were responding to the collapse of stocks of pollock in the 1980s as a result of
overfishing in an area of the Bering Strait known as
the Donut Hole. An international agreement eventually was signed in 1994, but this was too late for the
already depleted pollock.219 In July 2015, the five Arctic coastal states plus China, Japan, and South Korea
signed an unbinding declaration on unregulated fishing.220 Negotiations toward an enhanced governance
mechanism—by either creating a binding agreement
(the option proposed by the United States), a monitoring organization, or a broader non-binding agreement—have proceeded regularly, thus far meeting
in December 2015 and April 2016. While some U.S.
officials were heartened by China’s interest in participating in a precautionary voluntary regulatory
framework, a Greenpeace activist cautioned that the
measures proposed thus far are inadequate and may
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be a cover for the interests of countries in exploiting
fisheries in the Arctic when this becomes feasible in
the future.221
There have been some limited exchanges of views
between the United States and China on polar issues
since 2011 within the framework of the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, as well as a series of workshops
on U.S.-China Arctic Policy, involving academic and
government experts, first in Shanghai in May 2015,
and then in Washington, DC, in May 2016.222 Nonetheless, the Arctic has not yet played a major role in U.S.China diplomacy, which may reflect the relative lack
of importance of the Arctic on their bilateral agenda,
compared to hot button issues such as the South China
Sea, trade, and human rights, or the relatively modest role the Arctic has played in U.S. foreign policy
to date.
Interestingly, the Arctic is one area where the
United States and China agree on the need for freedom of navigation, though China has yet to directly
state its position on Canadian sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage or Russian sovereignty claims on
the Lomonosov ridge. The Chinese government finds
itself in a bind here—siding with the United States
on freedom of the seas in the Arctic, while beneficial
for Chinese economic interests in the region, would
nonetheless open China to criticism of its more restrictive definitions of sovereignty on “near seas” such as
the South China Sea and also adversely affect SinoRussian relations.223
For all its ambiguity, China’s Arctic policy has attracted considerable scrutiny, to the point of inquiring
if China feigns to observe global or regional norms
only to subvert them, and uses international law as a
weapon, an approach known as lawfare. According to
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this viewpoint, the Chinese government uses the law
(in this case the UNCLOS) to constrain its opponent
and exert psychological pressure by framing the media debate and influencing global public opinion, for
example, by asserting that the Arctic is a global commons.224 One widely cited analysis (though the author
was an undergraduate student at the time) suggested
that China used lawfare “to circumvent its weaker
status as a non-Arctic state through asymmetrical
means.”225 Most scholars fail to see any evidence of
China actively seeking to undermine Arctic norms or
misuse UNCLOS, though they point to efforts to take
advantage of ambiguities within it and to advance
Chinese interests in the region incrementally.226
CONCLUSION
China is playing a long game in the Arctic. The Arctic is the one area of the world where it remains at a
disadvantage, despite its emergence as a global power
and its economic and scientific interests in the region.
China fears being excluded from future economic and
scientific opportunities because of its current modest
voice on Arctic affairs. In the short term, China is limited by its observer status on the Arctic Council and its
technological/military capability. Within the existing
governance framework, China will continue to advocate that the forum take into account the legitimate
interests of non-Arctic states and the common interests of the international community.227 Because of the
restrictions on China’s role in the Arctic Council, the
primary institution for Arctic governance, in the long
term, China may try to seek changes in existing governance to better accommodate its interests. The trilateral meeting of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korea
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Foreign Ministers—all three Arctic Council observer
states—to discuss Arctic issues may be a step in this
direction.
Many Western experts see China pursuing an Arctic policy that supports its grand strategy to shape the
international order in such a way that China’s interests
as a global power are accommodated. This involves expanding Chinese military and economic capabilities,
advancing Chinese interests incrementally and defending Chinese sovereignty, while avoiding confrontation.228 The commitment of the Chinese government
to expanding its icebreaker capability, China’s Arctic
diplomacy, and the involvement of Chinese companies in resource deals in the region are also steps in this
direction, but the road ahead is far from clear. Since
China has yet to release an Arctic strategy, it is premature to link it to China’s grand strategy. Moreover,
although President Xi Jinping has concentrated more
foreign policymaking authority in his own hands than
many of his predecessors, multiple Chinese interests
are involved in China’s Arctic policy, with potentially
different agendas. These include the PLAN, the Foreign Ministry, the State Oceanic Administration, the
Chinese shipping and resource extracting companies,
just to name a few.229 As with the South China Sea,230
multiple participants in the policy process about the
Arctic may lead to contradictory policies that result
in increasing tensions in the region. Thus far, the lack
of clarity about China’s intentions in the Arctic has
increased suspicion, even with close partners such as
Russia.
Some of China’s interests in the Arctic overlap
with its Asian security agenda, including its aim to improve its energy security by diversifying its sources of
supply and supply routes.231 Access to Russia’s Arctic
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resources, in the long term, would help China overcome its “Malacca dilemma,” that is its fear that opponents or hostile forces could block its access to needed
energy supplies through the narrow choke point. We
also see Chinese companies and the Chinese government pursuing in the Arctic the aims of infrastructure
development and resource extraction that are central
to China’s One Belt One Road initiative for Central
Asia, South Asia, and Southern Europe. Not surprisingly, China’s northeastern provinces, which have
struggled to find sufficient employment opportunities
for workers in the shrinking state-owned enterprise
sector, are eager to encourage a “new Silk Road” to
the Arctic to lift up their own economic fortunes.
Nonetheless, the U.S. is an Arctic coastal state and
necessarily has more diverse, strategic, and domestic
interests at play in the Arctic than does China. Since
the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought
to redefine its interests in the Arctic, and China’s growing interest in the region comes at a time of flux in the
U.S. understanding of its own role there. Economic
opportunities, the impact of climate change, and shifts
in great power relations all have served to motivate a
greater commitment of U.S. resources to develop infrastructure and icebreaker capabilities, and maintain,
if not expand, military forces in the region.
China’s actions in the Arctic in the short term have
the greatest impact on U.S. global priorities, including
the economic and political stability of Europe, freedom
of navigation, and strategic concerns in other areas,
such as the role of Russia in Europe and of China in the
South China Sea. In the Nordic countries, China has
been acting like a savvy realtor eying a remote exurb
for future growth potential—China has engaged the
most economically vulnerable areas, such as Iceland
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and Greenland, earning goodwill and a foothold from
which to take advantage of unfolding opportunities.
Both Iceland and Greenland have their own domestic
political and economic concerns—Iceland being outside the EU and recovering from the 2008 economic
crisis, and Greenland seeking greater autonomy from
Denmark—that create a favorable climate for Chinese
overtures; at the same time, their security value to the
United States has increased in light of current tensions
with Russia in Northern Europe in the wake of the
Ukraine conflict.
In addition to their consequences for U.S. Security
interests in Northern Europe, China’s actions in the
Arctic also affect the U.S. priority on freedom of navigation. The transit of Chinese naval vessels in the U.S.
EEZ in the Bering Strait in September 2015 appeared
to some U.S. observers to indicate acceptance by China of the principle of freedom of navigation, which
Chinese officials have rejected in reference to the passage of U.S. Navy ships in areas China claims to be in
their territorial waters in the South China Sea.232 In a
May 2016 press conference, however, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lu Kang argued that freedom of navigation for commercial versus military vessels were
“completely different things,” and that UNCLOS does
not specifically allow innocent passage for military
ships that he described as “[willfully] trespassing.”233
Although China is concerned about Canadian and
Russian sovereignty claims potentially limiting Chinese shipping opportunities or at least raising their
cost due to tariffs, the Chinese government has not
specifically commented on their claims. Considering
China’s investment in political capital, military assets,
and infrastructure in defending its sovereignty in East
Asia, China may well take advantage of freedom of
navigation when it is possible, as with the U.S. EEZ
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in the Bering Strait, but tacitly at least support Canadian and Russian sovereignty over what they view as
their internal waters to enlist their support for China’s
claims in East Asia.234
Russia is the gatekeeper for China’s access to the
NSR. Although Russia had reservations about China's
acceptance as an Arctic Council observer (like Canada, and the United States to a lesser extent), since the
conflict in Ukraine and its resulting sanctions, Russian
officials have welcomed China’s investment in the
Russian Arctic. Many analysts overestimate the current differences between Russia and China in the Arctic and undervalue the Sino-Russian partnership as a
whole.235 At least while Putin and Xi Jinping remain in
presidential office in their respective countries, SinoRussian relations in the Arctic are likely to remain
cooperative, as Russia needs Chinese investments in
energy and infrastructure in the Russian Arctic, and
China needs Russian escorts, training in Arctic navigation, and opportunities for economic involvement
in the region.
Prior to 2014, Russia vacillated between its desire
for control over a strategically important region and
its increasing need for partners to develop its resources. The latter has worked to China’s advantage since
then and enabled more Sino-Russian cooperation in
the Arctic than might have been predicted a few years
ago. Nationalism in both countries undermines this
trend, however, by urging greater control for Russia
and leading to assertions in China of its perceived
rights in the Arctic, which could lead to Sino-Russian
tensions in the region in the future.236
Future developments in the Arctic have the potential to reshape Sino-Russian relations overall very fundamentally, however—a prospect that neither country
is prepared to address.
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As the international community seeks to maintain the pace of climate change within manageable
parameters—optimistically a 2 degree Celsius or 3.6
degree Fahrenheit change—scenarios for more severe
or even catastrophic changes bode ill for Sino-Russian
relations in the Arctic and in general.237 China’s rural
population will disproportionately bear the burden
of climate change effects, which, in China’s northern
breadbasket, will involve further water scarcity, desertification, and threats to food security.238 For example, China’s 2016 Climate Assessment Report states:
shrinking of river flows caused by the melting away of
glaciers in western China may lead to struggles over
cross-border water resources and surges of transnational migration, triggering international disputes and
conflict.239

In the long term, such pressures may lead to internal
migration and as well to pressures in the Sino-Russian
border regions over access to water, land, and food,
which could in turn result in environmental migration
of Chinese citizens to Russia.
The Arctic itself is both a contributor to climate
change and its victim, creating a particular burden for
Arctic states and non-Arctic stakeholders, who thus
far have focused more on short-term and mid-term
issues, such as boundary demarcation and resource
exploration, than on the region’s future. Although
climate change has enabled economic cooperation to
develop in the Arctic, the use of obtained fossil fuel resources then contribute to adverse trends in the region,
such as sea water rises and changes in weather patterns, with negative consequences for other countries
outside the region as well as the Arctic itself. What is
needed, Oran Young argues, is a new and more com64

prehensive approach to Arctic governance that can
better anticipate and address long-term challenges.240
For this to occur, however, major stakeholders have to
agree on the nature of these challenges and the steps
needed to address them. Given China’s need for resources to maintain its economic growth trajectory,
the most elusive form of Sino-American cooperation
in the Arctic may yet be over the urgency of addressing climate change.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Implication 1.
Although it may be useful to raise the inconsistencies between China’s views on sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the Arctic and the South China
Sea, linkage between the two is unlikely to work. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese government
has become increasingly entrenched in its assertion of
its sovereign rights in East Asia, and these aims are
unlikely to be moderated for access to future opportunities in the Arctic. China’s Arctic aims support the
country’s overall interest in taking advantage of opportunities befitting a global power, but the Chinese
government’s defense of its sovereignty in East Asia
relates to core interests that are viewed as central to
the country’s political stability and identity.
Implication 2.
China and the United States have many common
interests in the Arctic, including maritime safety, addressing unregulated driftnet fishing, and avoiding
oil spills. Moreover, U.S. and Chinese Coast Guards
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have cooperated for many years and developed relationships that are useful to address future contingencies in the Arctic and elsewhere in the world. The
United States and China should continue to develop
operational level relationships to address their common concerns in the Arctic.
Implication 3.
The United States should engage its Asian allies,
Japan and South Korea, as well as its Asian partners
like Singapore and India on Arctic issues. It is not in
the U.S. interest or in that of the Arctic Council for
observer states to coalesce outside the forum and, during its last year as Chairman, the United States should
develop a better outreach strategy to all Asian states
with interests in the Arctic. This could focus on shared
interests such as shipping, fishing, or minerals exploration, or concerns such as climate change, maritime
safety, and Arctic navigation.
Implication 4.
China faces reputational barriers in northern Europe, who traditionally has been concerned with human rights, to expanding its influence in the Arctic.
China’s resource investments in Africa, South America, and Asia have revealed its disregard for environmental and human rights issues in its areas of investment. Nonetheless, China’s resource investments in
the Arctic may enable China to further institutionalize
its presence there in the future, as China did with its
naval base in Djibouti, Africa, which followed a pattern of Chinese resource investments in Africa.
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Implication 5.
There is no “Great Game” in the Arctic. For the
most part, since the end of the Cold War, cooperation
has characterized the region. In recent years, however,
issues from outside the Arctic have cast a shadow on
it, including the European financial crisis and the tensions between NATO and Russia. China has taken advantage of these problems to expand its own influence
in the Arctic by improving its ties with both Iceland
and Russia.
Implication 6.
The United States needs to distinguish between
U.S.-Russia tensions in Europe and our relations in the
Arctic and keep Russian Arctic actions in perspective.
Russia has the longest coastline in the Arctic Circle
and needs to invest in infrastructure to develop it. Discussion of an “icebreaker gap” is not very helpful—it
would make no sense for the United States to compete
with Russia, which has an extensive Arctic coastline,
in the deployment of icebreakers, nor do we have the
resources or rationale to do so.
Implication 7.
Although the Arctic has been relatively insulated
from interstate conflicts since the end of the Cold War,
the region now risks becoming involved in a security
dilemma dynamic, according to which uncertainties
about Russian intentions drive NATO to take counteractions which then lead to a Russian response, and
so forth.241 The necessity of sanctions against Russia
notwithstanding, some confidence building mea-
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sures would be useful in the Arctic to restore trust
among the regional states and reduce the likelihood
of militarizing the region in response to developments
outside it.
Implication 8.
There is at times a mismatch between available
governance mechanisms in the Arctic and the issues
at stake, as the Arctic Council is restricted from addressing security issues. The need for a mechanism to
address operational security issues, such as maritime
safety, led, for example, to the creation of the Arctic
Coast Guard forum. However, after the Russian takeover of Crimea, Russian experts were not included in
2014 experts meetings about the new organization,
and sanctions against Russia over Ukraine have reduced Russian involvement in other fora dealing with
Arctic issues. This is shortsighted as it would be difficult to address most Arctic issues (maritime safety and
oil spills, for example) without Russian participation.
Implication 9.
Experts have suggested a variety of mechanisms to
address security issues:
• Make use of existing security fora such as the
Nordic Defense Ministers, the Arctic Security
Conference, and include Russian participation.
Since Russia is a primary security concern for
Nordic states, excluding Russia from these venues is counter-productive.
• Reform the Arctic Council along the lines of the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe to include a “basket” or component for
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addressing security issues, in addition to maintaining the focus on indigenous communities,
and economic and environmental issues that
the current Arctic Council has.242
• Hold a meeting of heads of states of Arctic
states to address security concerns that threaten
to militarize the region and shift it away from
its environmental and economic priorities.243
Although European regional cooperation mechanisms have inspired much of the discussion about
Arctic governance, Asia’s experience is also relevant.
For example, a regular forum for high-level political
dialogue on Arctic issues could be patterned on the
East Asian Summit mechanism for East Asia. To include security issues in the discussion and develop
confidence-building measures, a broader forum could
be created similar to the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum that brings
together outsiders and insiders to address common
security issues.
Implication 10.
The United States also needs to pursue a long game
in the Arctic, involving long-term investments in infrastructure such as icebreakers and deepwater ports,
as well as personnel, such as the Army’s 4th Brigade
Combat Team, and a commitment to the scientific understanding of climate change in the region. Because
of the long lead times in developing infrastructure,
especially icebreakers, decisions cannot be contingent on short-term commercial prospects, and need to
take into account future contingencies in terms of the
growing accessibility of the Arctic to a wider range of

69

actors with goals and practices that potentially differ
from those of the United States. Access to the Arctic
will only grow, leaving the United States open to new
threats as well as opportunities.
Implication 11.
It is difficult for the United States to assert its interests in the Arctic or protest their infringement without ratifying UNCLOS. As the only Arctic state that
has not ratified the agreement, we are marginalized
on important discussions of its application, including
with China. The current administration should make
this a priority.
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